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Abstract:  This paper documents that ventures that are funded by two successful angel groups 
experience superior outcomes to those that are rejected: they have improved survival, exits, 
employment levels, patenting, web traffic, and financing. We use strong discontinuities in the 
funding behavior of angels over small changes in their collective interest levels to implement a 
regression discontinuity approach. We confirm the positive effect of angel financing on most 
operations of the venture, with qualitative support for a higher likelihood of successful exits. On 
the other hand, there is no difference in access to additional financing around the discontinuity. 
This might suggest that financing is not a central input of angel groups. 
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One of the central and more enduring questions in the entrepreneurial finance literature is 
to what extent early-stage financiers such as angels or venture funds have a real impact on the 
firms in which they invest. An extensive theoretical literature suggests the combination of 
intensive monitoring, provision of value added services, and powerful control rights in these 
types of deals should alleviate agency problems between entrepreneurs and institutional 
investors.
1
 This bundle of inputs, it is argued, leads to improved governance and operations in 
portfolio firms, lower capital constraints, and ultimately stronger firm growth and performance. 
The empirical documentation of this impact, however, has been challenging. Hellmann 
and Puri (2000) provide a first detailed comparison of the growth path of firms backed by 
venture financing with those that are not.
2
 This approach, however, faces the natural challenge 
that unobserved heterogeneity across entrepreneurs, such as ability or ambition, might drive the 
growth path of the firms as well as the venture capitalists‘ decisions to invest. The question 
remains whether seed-stage investors have a causal impact on the performance of start-ups or 
whether their main role is to select firms that have better inherent growth opportunities. These 
problems are particularly acute for evaluating early-stage investments that are opaque by their 
very nature. 
An alternative approach has been to find exogenous shocks to venture financing at the 
industry or regional levels. Examples of such shocks are public policy changes (Kortum and 
Lerner, 2000), variations in endowment returns (Samila and Sorenson, 2010), and differences in 
state pension funding levels (Mollica and Zingales, 2007). These studies, however, can only 
examine the impact of entrepreneurial finance at an aggregate level, which resembles a ―needle 
                                                            
1 Examples include Admati and Pfleiderer (1994), Berglöf (1994), Bergemann and Hege (1998), Hellmann (1998), 
and Cornelli and Yosha (2003).  
2 A similar approach is taken in Puri and Zarutskie (2008) and Chemmanur et al. (2009) who employ comprehensive 
Census Bureau records of private firms to form more detailed control groups based on observable characteristics. 
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in the haystack‖ challenge, given the very modest share that high-potential firms represent of all 
economic activity.  
This paper takes a fresh look at the question of whether entrepreneurial financiers affect 
the success and growth of new ventures. We focus on a neglected segment of entrepreneurial 
finance: angel investments. Angel investors have received much less attention than venture 
capitalists, despite the fact that some estimates suggest that these investors are as important for 
high-potential start-up investments as venture capital firms (Goldfarb et al., 2007; Shane, 2008; 
Sudek et al., 2008). Angel investors are increasingly structured as semi-formal networks of high-
net-worth individuals, often former entrepreneurs themselves, who meet in regular intervals 
(often over a monthly breakfast or dinner) to hear aspiring entrepreneurs pitch their business 
plans. The angels then decide whether to conduct further due diligence and ultimately whether to 
invest in some of these deals as subgroups of members. Similar to venture capitalists, angel 
groups often adopt a very hands-on role in the deals they invest in and provide entrepreneurs 
with advice and contacts. 
In addition to their inherent interest as funders of early-stage companies, angel 
investment groups have an advantage for researchers over other venture funders in that they 
make their investment decisions through well-documented processes and, in some cases, formal 
votes.
3
 This allows us to observe the level of support or lack thereof for the deals that come 
before the angel groups.
4
 
                                                            
3 By way of contrast, the venture firms that we talked to all employ a consensual process, in which controversial 
proposals are withdrawn before coming up for a formal vote or disagreements are resolved in conversations before 
the actual voting takes place. In addition, venture firms also rarely document the detailed voting behind their 
decisions. Angel group members, in contrast, often express their interest for deals independently from one another 
and based upon personal assessment. 
4 Our paper is closest in spirit to work in the entrepreneurial finance literature on the investment selection process 
and returns of venture capitalists. Sorensen (2007) assesses the returns to being funded by different tiers of investors. 
Our work instead focuses on the margin of obtaining initial funding or not. Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) and 
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Our analysis exploits very detailed, deal-level data of startups that pitched to two 
prominent angel investment groups (Tech Coast Angels and CommonAngels) during the 2001-
2006 period. These organizations generously provided us access to confidential records of the 
companies who approached them, the level of angel interest, the financing decisions made, and 
the subsequent venture outcomes. The dataset allows us to compare funded and unfunded 
ventures that approached the same investor. Furthermore, we use the interest levels expressed by 
the angels to form specialized treatment and control groups that have similar qualities.
5
  
In addition, our data allow us to go further towards confirming a causal relationship by 
using a regression discontinuity approach (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
6
 Within the quality ranges 
that we analyze, there exists a discrete jump in the probability of venture funding as interest 
accumulates around a deal. This discontinuity is due to how critical mass develops within angel 
groups around prospective deals. 
We identify from the data the threshold where a critical mass of angels emerges around a 
deal. Our approach compares firms that fall just above this threshold with the firms that fall just 
below. The underlying identification relies on firms around the cut-off level having very similar 
ex ante characteristics, in which case we can confirm the causal effect of obtaining angel 
financing. After showing the ex ante comparability of the ventures in the border region, we 
examine differences in their long-run performance. In this way, we can employ micro-data on 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Kaplan et al. (2009) examine characteristics and dimensions that venture capitalists rely on when making investment 
decisions. Goldfarb et al. (2007) and Conti et al. (2010) consider choices between angels and venture investors. 
5 Thus, our work encompasses many of the matching traits used by prior work—industry, employment levels and 
growth rates, age, etc.—but also captures better the motivations of entrepreneurs (i.e., the control group also 
approached the investor at the same time as the treatment group) and the underlying qualities of the ventures (i.e., 
the angels rated the ventures comparably at the time of their pitch). To illustrate these gains more graphically, 
consider the case of Twitter (which is not part of our sample). Researchers can observe that Twitter is four years old, 
has approximately 300 employees (http://twitter.com/about, accessed December 20, 2010), is growing rapidly in 
terms of employment but not revenue, is located in Silicon Valley, and so on. But even with this information set, it is 
very hard to identify companies to which one should compare Twitter. Our data allow us to compare funded 
ventures to others that the same sophisticated investors thought comparable at the time of the investment pitch. 
6 While common in economics, this approach is underutilized in finance. Exceptions include Rauh (2006), 
Chernenko and Sunderam (2009), and Bakke and Whited (2010). 
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firm outcomes, while further minimizing the problem of unobserved heterogeneity between the 
funded and rejected transactions. 
Several clear patterns emerge from our analysis: first, and not surprisingly, the interest 
levels expressed by angels in deals are a substantial factor in funding decisions. Second, when 
we compare firms that received funding to those that did not within a narrow quality range, the 
funded firms overall look more successful than those that pitched to the angel group but did not 
receive financing: they are 20%-25% more likely to survive for at least four years (or until 
December 2010, the last date of our data). They are also 9%-11% more likely to undergo a 
successful exit (IPO or acquisition) and 16%-19% more likely to have either reached a successful 
exit or grown to 75 employees by December 2010. Funded companies have 16-20 more 
employees as of 2010, are 16%-18% more likely to have a granted patent, and are growing faster 
as measured through web traffic performance between 2008 and 2010. In addition, funded 
companies are better financed. Overall, they have a 70% higher likelihood of obtaining 
entrepreneurial finance and have on average a little less than two additional financing rounds. 
These subsequent deals are often syndicated by the angel group with other venture financiers. 
These results are developed using ventures that fall within a narrow quality range. We 
also demonstrate that the impact of angel funding on firm outcomes would be overstated if we 
look at the full distribution of ventures that approach the angel groups, since there is a clear 
correlation between initial venture quality and likelihood of funding. Using several techniques 
(e.g., matched samples, modeling angel interest as a covariate), we estimate that one would 
overstate the measured effects by about 25% if using the full distribution of deals that 
approached the investors. This emphasizes the importance and challenge of creating proper 
control groups in entrepreneurial finance studies. 
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Our third set of findings considers ventures just above and below the funding threshold 
using the regression discontinuity methodology, which removes the endogeneity of funding and 
other omitted variable biases if ventures just below and above the funding threshold are 
otherwise very similar. We confirm several of our prior findings: ventures just above the 
threshold are more likely to survive, and they have superior operations in terms of employee 
counts, patenting, and web traffic growth. We also find qualitative support that funded ventures 
achieved a successful exit by December 2010, but these results are not statistically significant. 
This latter difference may suggest that the angel groups select on ventures with quicker exit 
prospects, which are not captured in our initial interest measures.  
Interestingly, we do not find an impact of angel funding on follow-on financing when 
using the regression discontinuity approach. This difference to the estimates based on a simple 
comparison between funded and non-funded firms may suggest that access to additional 
financing is not essential for the success of angel-funded firms just above the threshold. But 
when looking at the full distribution of funded versus non-funded ventures, the positive selection 
bias of receiving angel funding translates into a higher likelihood of follow-on funding. This 
result might also underline that, in the time period we study, prior angel financing was not an 
essential prerequisite to accessing follow-on funding. 
In a final step, we compare the returns of the venture capital industry to that of one of the 
angel groups. A natural concern is that these investments are by angels who are not professional 
investors, and thus their decisions and voting may be shaped by factors other than economic 
considerations (e.g., the joy of working with start-up companies). While our project focuses on 
the consequences of financing for start-up ventures, this additional analysis helps confirm that 
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the investments were warranted for the angel group as a whole. We find that the angel group 
performed as well as the venture capital industry overall during the period of study. 
Thus, this paper provides new evidence about an essential question in entrepreneurial 
finance. We quantify the positive impact that these two angel groups had on the companies that 
they funded by simultaneously exploiting novel, rich micro-data and addressing concerns about 
unobserved heterogeneity. We should note, however, that the angel groups that we worked with 
for this project are two of the largest and most established groups in the country. They are both 
professionally managed, and at least one group performed as well as the venture industry as a 
whole during the period we study. Given the substantial heterogeneity across angel investors, the 
magnitude of the impact that we estimate is likely to be at the upper end of the angel population. 
We hope that future research can further quantify the extent to which other angel investment 
groups and individual investors aid start-up ventures. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 1 reviews the angel group investment 
process. Section 2 introduces our angel investment data and describes our methodology. Section 
3 introduces our outcomes data. Section 4 presents the analysis. Section 5 evaluates the portfolio 
returns for one of the angel groups. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
1. The Angel Group Investment Process 
Angel investors are high-net-worth individuals that make private investments in start-up 
companies with their own money. While angel investors have a long history (e.g., Lamoreaux et 
al., 2004), angel groups are a quite recent phenomenon. Beginning in the mid-1990s, angels 
began forming groups to collectively evaluate and invest in entrepreneurial ventures. These 
groups are seen as having several advantages by the angels. First, angels can pool their capital to 
7 
 
make larger investments than they could otherwise fund alone. Second, each angel can invest 
smaller amounts in individual ventures, allowing participation in more opportunities and the 
diversification of investment risks. They can also undertake costly due diligence of prospective 
investments as a group, reducing the burdens for individual members. Fourth, these groups are 
generally more visible to entrepreneurs and thus receive a superior deal flow. Finally, the groups 
frequently include some of the most sophisticated and active angel investors in a given region, 
which results in superior decision-making. 
The Angel Capital Association (ACA) lists 300 U.S. groups in its database. The average 
ACA angel group had 42 member angels and invested a total of $1.94 million in 7.3 deals in 
2007. Between 10,000 and 15,000 angels are believed to belong to angel groups in the U.S.
7
 
Angel groups follow mostly similar templates. Entrepreneurs typically begin the process 
by submitting to the group an application that may also include a copy of their business plan or 
executive summary. The firms, after an initial screening by the staff, are then invited to give a 
short presentation to a small group of members, followed by a question-and-answer session. 
Promising companies are then invited to present at a monthly meeting (often a breakfast or 
dinner). The presenting companies that generate the greatest interest then enter a due diligence 
review process by a smaller group of angel members, although the extent to which due diligence 
and screening leads or follows the formal presentation varies across groups. If all goes well, this 
process results in an investment one to three months after the presentation. Figure 1 provides a 
detailed template for Tech Coast Angels (Sudek et al., 2008). 
  
                                                            
7 Statistics are based on http://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/ (accessed February 15, 2010). 
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2. Angel Group Data and Empirical Methodology 
This section jointly introduces our data and empirical methodology. The discussion is 
organized around the two groups from which we have obtained large datasets. The unique 
features of each investment group, their venture selection procedures, and their data records 
require that we employ conceptually similar, but operationally different, techniques for 
identifying group-specific discontinuities. We commence with Tech Coast Angels, the larger of 
our two investment groups, and we devote extra time in this first data description to also 
conveying our empirical approach and the biases it is meant to address. We then describe our 
complementary approach with CommonAngels and how we ultimately join the two groups 
together to analyze their joint behavior. 
 
2.1. Tech Coast Angels 
Tech Coast Angels is a large angel investment group based in southern California. They 
have over 300 angels in five chapters and seek high-growth investments in a variety of high-tech 
and low-tech industries. The group typically looks for funding opportunities of $1 million or less. 
Additional details on this venture group are available at http://www.techcoastangels.com/.
8
  
Tech Coast Angels kindly provided us with access to their database regarding prospective 
ventures under explicit restrictions that the confidentiality of individual ventures and angels 
remain secure. For our study, this database was exceptional in that it allowed us to fully observe 
the deal flow of Tech Coast Angels: it has detailed information about many of the companies that 
were and were not funded by Tech Coast Angels. Our analysis considers ventures that 
                                                            
8 Tech Coast Angels grows from two to four chapters during our period of study, with 30-40 active angels on 
average per chapter. Appendix Table 1 provides additional details.   
9 
 
approached Tech Coast Angels between 2001 and 2006: as of early 2007, there were over 2500 
ventures in the database.  
We first document in Table 1 the distribution of interest from the angel investors across 
the full set of potential deals. This description sets the stage for identifying a narrower group of 
firms around a funding discontinuity that offers a better approach for evaluating the 
consequences of angel financing. Table 2 then evaluates the ex ante comparability of deals 
around the border, which is essential for the identification strategy. 
The central variable for the Tech Coast Angel analysis is the count of the number of 
angels expressing interest in a given deal. This indication of interest does not represent a 
financial commitment, but instead expresses a belief that the venture should be pursued further 
by the group. The decision to invest ultimately depends upon three factors: one or more angels 
being strong champions of the deal, the support of the professional manager, and a critical mass 
of angels being willing to fund the venture as a group. While we do not observe the champions 
of the deals, we do have a unique window into how funding relates to obtaining a critical mass of 
interested angels. 
Table 1 documents the distribution of deals and angel interest levels. The first three 
columns of Table 1 show 64% of ventures receive no interest at all. Moreover, 90% of all 
ventures receive interest from fewer than ten angels. This narrowing funnel continues until the 
highest bracket, where there are 44 firms that receive interest from 35 or more angels. 15 
ventures receive the interest of 50 angels or more. This funnel shares many of the anecdotal traits 
of venture funding—such as selecting a few worthy ventures out of thousands of business 
plans—but it is exceptionally rare to have the interest level documented consistently throughout 
the distribution and independent of actual funding outcomes. 
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The shape of this funnel has several potential interpretations. It may reflect heterogeneity 
in quality among companies that are being pitched to the angels. It could also reflect simple 
industry differences across ventures. For example, the average software venture may receive 
greater interest than a medical devices company if there are more angels within the group 
involved in the software industry. There could also be an element of herding around ―hot deals‖. 
But independent of what exactly drives this investment behavior of angels, we want to explore 
whether there are discontinuities in interest levels such that small changes in the number of 
angels expressing interest among otherwise comparable deals results in material shifts in the 
probability of funding. 
The central idea behind this identification strategy is that angel interest in ventures does 
not map one-to-one into quality differences across ventures, which we verify empirically below. 
Instead, there is some randomness or noise in why some firms receive n votes and others receive 
n+1. It is reasonable to believe that there are enough idiosyncrasies in the preferences and beliefs 
of angels that the interest count does not present a perfect ranking of the quality of the 
underlying firms. Certainly, the 2% of ventures with 35 or more interested angels are not 
comparable to the 64% of ventures with zero interest. But, we will show that ventures with 18 
votes and 22 votes are much more comparable, except that the latter group is much more likely 
to be funded. 
We thus need to demonstrate two patterns. First, we need to identify where in the 
distribution small changes in interest level lead to a critical mass of angels, and thus a substantial 
increase in funding probability. As Tech Coast Angels does not have explicit funding rules that 
yield a mandated cut-off, we must identify from observed behavior where de facto breaks exist. 
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We then need to show that deals immediately above and below this threshold appear similar at 
the time that they approached Tech Coast Angels. 
To investigate the first part, the last column of Table 1 documents the fraction of ventures 
in each interest group that are ultimately funded by Tech Coast Angels. None of the ventures 
with zero interest are funded, whereas over 40% of deals in the highest interest category are. The 
rise in funding probability with interest level is monotonic, excepting some small fluctuations at 
high interest levels. Ventures with high interest levels can remain unfunded by Tech Coast 
Angels for multiple reasons: e.g., the subsequent due diligence process turns up poor 
information, the parties cannot agree upon deal terms, and the start-up chooses to take financing 
elsewhere and withdraws.  
There is a very stark jump in funding probability between interest levels of 15-19 angels 
and 20-24 angels, where the funded share increases from 17% to 38%. This represents a distinct 
and permanent shift in the relationship between funding and interest levels. We thus identify this 
point as our discontinuity for Tech Coast Angels. In most of what follows, we discard deals that 
are far away from this threshold, focusing on the region around the border. This restriction 
prepares us for the border discontinuity exercise, but it is also warranted because the quality and 
funding prospects for ventures are most comparable in this region. Operationally, the narrower 
range of the quality distribution is also needed for many of our outcome variables since 
collecting records for unfunded ventures is very challenging. 
We specifically drop the 90% of deals with fewer than ten interested angels and the 44 
deals with very high interest levels. We designate our ―above border‖ group as those ventures 
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with interest levels of 20-34 angels; our ―below border‖ group is defined as ventures with 
interest levels of 10-19 angels.
9
 
Appendix Table 1 provides further details on Tech Coast Angels‘ selection process by 
year. Our choice of a raw angel count to designate the funding border, while the overall angel 
network is growing in size, reflects two considerations. First, and most important, angels invest 
as subgroups of members once sufficient interest is achieved. Thus, comparisons to the overall 
size of the network are less important than actual counts of angels interested in participating in a 
deal. Second, and more operationally, the growth in Tech Coast Angels is mainly through new 
chapters. While angels can be involved in deals in other chapters, statistics like the count of 
active angels per chapter, the average interest level in a funded deal, and the share of ventures 
funded by Tech Coast Angels across years are quite stable despite the changes in the absolute 
size of the network. These factors suggest that the time-invariant bar is the most appropriate. 
Having identified from the data the border discontinuity, we now verify the second 
requirement that ventures above and below the border are ex ante comparable except in the 
probability that they received funding from Tech Coast Angels. This step is necessary to assert 
that we have identified a quasi-exogenous component to angel investing that is not merely 
reflecting underlying quality differences among the firms. Once established, a comparison of the 
outcomes of above border versus below border ventures will provide strong confirmation of the 
role of angel financing in venture success as their initial qualities are very similar. 
Before assessing this comparability, we make two sample adjustments. First, to allow us 
to later jointly analyze our two investment groups, we restrict the sample to ventures that 
                                                            
9 There is also a discrete step in funding probability around having ten or more interested angels, relative to having 
5-9 interested angels. This margin would be interesting to study as well, but it is operationally quite difficult as the 
information collected for the typical unfunded venture declines at lower interest levels (e.g., due diligence reviews 
are not undertaken). We set the lower bound for our study to be above this threshold of ten angels being interested. 
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approached Tech Coast Angels in the 2001-2006 period. This restriction also allows us a 
minimum horizon of four years for measuring outcomes. Second, we remove cases where the 
funding opportunity is withdrawn from consideration by the venture itself. These withdrawn 
deals are mainly due to ventures being funded by venture capital firms (i.e., the venture courted 
multiple financiers simultaneously). As these deals do not fit well into our conceptual experiment 
of the benefits and costs of receiving or being denied angel funding, it is best to omit them from 
the sample. Our final sample includes 87 firms from Tech Coast Angels, with 46 ventures being 
above the border and 41 below. 45 of the 87 ventures are funded by Tech Coast Angels. 
Table 2 shows that the characteristics of ventures above and below the funding threshold 
are very similar to one another ex ante. If our empirical approach is correct, the randomness in 
how localized interest develops will result in the observable characteristics of firms immediately 
above and below the threshold not being statistically different. Table 2 documents this 
comparability across a number of venture characteristics. Columns 2 and 3 present the means of 
the above border and below border groups, respectively. The fourth column tests for the equality 
of the means, with the t-tests allowing for unequal variance. 
The two border groups are very comparable in terms of venture traits, industries, and 
venture stages. The first four rows show that basic characteristics like the amount of funding 
requested, the documents provided by the venture to the angels, and the firm‘s number of 
managers and employees are not materially different for the firms above and below the 
discontinuity. The same is true for industry composition and stage of the business (e.g., whether 
the firm is in the idea stage, in its initial marketing and product development stage, or already 
revenue generating). We report two-tailed tests for simplicity; differences in means for all traits 
are not significant at a 10% level in one-tailed tests in either direction as well. Pearson Chi 
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Squared probabilities for the latter two distributions are 0.831 and 0.534, respectively. For all of 
these traits, the null hypothesis that the two groups are similar is not rejected.
10
 
While there are no observable differences in the characteristics of the ventures in the first 
three panels, the fourth panel of Table 2 shows that there are significant differences in how 
angels engage with ventures above and below the cut-off. With just a small adjustment in interest 
levels, angels assemble many more documents regarding the venture (evidence of due diligence), 
have more discussion points in their database about the opportunity, and ultimately are 60% 
more likely to fund the venture. All of these differences are statistically significant. This supports 
our identifying hypothesis that there is a non-linear change in the provision of resources from the 
angel group around the cut-off. This will allow us to identify the effect of the bundle of inputs 
that the angels provide, holding constant the underlying quality of the firms around the cut-off. 
 
2.2. CommonAngels 
CommonAngels is a leading angel investment group in Boston, Massachusetts. They 
have over 70 angels seeking high-growth investments in high-tech industries. The group 
typically looks for funding opportunities between $500 thousand and $5 million. Additional 
details on this venture group are available at http://www.commonangels.com.
11
  
CommonAngels kindly provided us with access to their database regarding prospective 
ventures under explicit restrictions that the confidentiality of individual ventures and angels 
remain secure. The complete database for CommonAngels as of early 2007 contains over 2000 
ventures. Unlike the Tech Coast Angels data, however, CommonAngels does not record interest 
                                                            
10 Despite the power of these tests, we recognize that there are limits to what we can discern regarding the ventures. 
Most important, soft features (e.g., quality perceptions of management team) may systematically vary in ways not 
captured by our data.    
11 CommonAngels had about 50 members throughout our period of study, before expanding to 70 in recent years. 
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for all deals. We thus cannot explicitly construct a distribution similar to Table 1. Nevertheless, 
the funnel process is again such that a small fraction of ventures receive funding (2-3%). A little 
under 30% of ventures that reach the pitch stage with CommonAngels receive funding. 
CommonAngels does, however, conduct a paper-based poll of members following 
pitches at its monthly breakfast meetings. Most important, attending angels give the venture an 
overall score. Angels also provide comments about ventures and potential investments they 
might make in the company. Figure 2 provides a recent evaluation sheet. We focus on the overall 
score provided by angels for the venture as this metric is collected on a consistent basis 
throughout the sample period. 
CommonAngels provided us with the original ballots for all pitches between 2001 and 
2006. After dropping two poor quality records, our sample has 63 pitches in total. One potential 
approach would be to order deals by the average interest levels of angels attending the pitch. We 
find, however, that the information content in this measure is limited. Instead, the data strongly 
suggest that the central funding discontinuity exists around the share of attending angels that 
award a venture an extremely high score. During the six years covered, CommonAngels used 
both a five and ten point scale. It is extremely rare that an angel awards a perfect score to a pitch. 
The breaking point for funding instead exists around the share of attending angels that award the 
pitch 90% or more of the maximum score (that is, 4.5 out of 5, 9 out of 10). This is close in spirit 
to the dichotomous expression of interest in the Tech Coast Angels database.  
Some simple statistics describe the non-linear effect. Of the 63 pitches, 14 ventures 
receive a 90% or above score from at least one angel; no deal receives such a score from more 
than 40% of attending angels. Of these 14 deals, 7 deals are ultimately funded by 
CommonAngels. Of the 49 other deals, only 11 are funded. This stark discontinuity is not present 
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when looking at lower cut-offs for interest levels. For example, all but 12 ventures receive at 
least one vote that is 80% of the maximum score (that is, 4 out of 5, 8 out of 10). There is no 
further material difference in funding probability based upon receiving more or fewer 80% votes. 
The same applies to lower cut-offs for interest levels. 
We restrict the sample to the 43 deals that have at least 20% of the attending angels 
giving the presentation a score that is 80% of the maximum possible score or above. As a 
specific example, a venture is retained after presenting to a breakfast meeting of 30 angels if at 
least six of those angels score the venture as 8 out of 10 or higher. This step removes the weakest 
presentations and ventures. We then define our border groups based upon the share of attending 
angels that give the venture a score greater than or equal to 90% of the maximum possible score. 
To continue our example, a venture is considered above border if it garners six or more angels 
awarding the venture 9 out of 10 or better. A venture with only five angels at this extreme value 
is classified as below border. 
While distinct, this procedure is conceptually very similar to the sample construction and 
culling undertaken with the Tech Coast Angels data. We only drop 20 CommonAngels pitches 
that receive low scores, but that is because the selection into providing a formal pitch to the 
group itself accomplishes much of the pruning. With Tech Coast Angels, we drop 90% of the 
potential deals due to low interest levels. We implicitly do the same with CommonAngels by 
focusing only on 63 pitches out of over 2000 deals in the full database of submitted plans. 
Our formal empirical analyses jointly consider the two groups. To facilitate this merger, 
we construct uniform industry classifications and two simple indicator variables for whether a 
venture is funded or not and whether the venture is above or below the border discontinuity. This 
pooling produces a regression sample of 130 ventures. 
17 
 
 
3. Outcome Data 
This section documents the data that we collect on venture outcomes. This is the most 
significant challenge for this type of project as we seek comparable data for both funded and 
unfunded ventures. In many cases, the prospective deals are small and recently formed, and may 
not even be incorporated. We develop three categories of outcomes: venture survival and 
success, venture operations and growth, and venture financing. 
 
3.1. Venture Survival and Success 
Our simplest measure is a binary indicator variable for firm survival as of December 
2010. This survival date is a minimum of four years after the potential funding event with the 
angel group. We develop this measure through several data sources. We first directly contacted 
as many ventures as possible to learn their current status. Second, we looked for evidence of the 
ventures‘ operations in industry databases or news wires.12 Finally, we examine every venture‘s 
web site, if one exists. Existence of a web site is not sufficient for being alive, as some ventures 
leave a web site running after closing operations. We thus based our measurement on how recent 
various items like press releases were.
13
 
Our second measure is a binary indicator variable for whether the venture had undergone 
a successful exit by December 2010. A successful exit can either be an initial public offering 
(IPO) or a successful acquisition. We code acquisitions as successful exits or not based upon the 
                                                            
12 Industry databases include CorpTech, VentureXpert, Dun & Bradstreet, and Hoover‘s. Industry news sources (all 
sources are online with a ―.com‖ suffix) include yahoo, linkedin, inc, businessweek, spoke, manta, venturebeat, 
wikipedia, crunchbase, glassdoor, insideview, healthcareitnews, socaltech, masshightech, xconomy, and boston. 
13 In cases of acquisitions, we code whether the venture is alive or not through a judgment about the size of the 
acquisition. Ventures are counted as alive if the acquisition or merger was a successful exit that included major 
announcements or exit valuations greater than $5 million (where known). If the event was termed an ―asset sale‖ or 
similar phrase, we code the venture as not having survived. The results below are robust to simply dropping these 
cases. 
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press releases, news articles, and blog posts surrounding the event. We define an unsuccessful 
exit as an ―asset sale‖ or similar transaction. In total, 3 and 8 of our 130 ventures had a 
successful IPO or acquisition, respectively, by December 2010.
14
 Given the short time horizon, 
judging success through liquidity events may be restrictive—some successful entrepreneurs may 
have passed on exit opportunities to continue growing their businesses. Thus, our third measure 
augments the successful exit measure to also include if the venture has 75 or more employees in 
2010, which we will also adjust below to thresholds of 50 and 100 employees. 22 of our 130 
ventures are successful according to this combined measure. By contrast, 45 of the 130 ventures 
have closed or had an unsuccessful exit. 
 
3.2. Venture Operations and Growth 
Our second set of metrics quantifies venture operations and growth after the potential 
financing event. While we would ideally consider a broad range of performance variables such 
as sales and product introductions, obtaining data on private ventures is extremely challenging. 
This is especially true for unfunded ventures. We are able to employ three outcome variables: 
employment, patents, and web site traffic. These three measures also allow for more 
differentiation between firms than the binary indicators used for venture success.  
We first consider the employment level of the venture in 2010. Employment measures are 
collected using the sources described above for venture survival. While we identified exact 
                                                            
14 In five of our eight successful acquisition cases, acquisition values greater than $40 million are reported in the 
media. In a sixth case, while the acquisition value was not disclosed, the acquired company disclosed substantial 
revenues (>$12m) and investor returns (>200%). Two cases are more difficult to assign. In the first, the venture 
(funded and above border) received major press attention at acquisition, with significant discussion of its integration 
and then joint release of the next product. This venture still operates as a private subsidiary of the acquiring 
company, and the investor considers it a success while not disclosing the returns. In the second, the venture 
(unfunded and below border) was estimated to have had more than 50 employees and four funding rounds at 
acquisition, and was described as ―major‖ in the press. Recoding the last two cases as unsuccessful acquisitions 
marginally strengthens our empirical results below. 
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employment levels for many ventures, in other cases we had to transform reported employment 
ranges into point estimates. We applied a consistent rule in these cases to all ventures with the 
specified range. The chosen point estimates reflect the typical firm size distribution through the 
range (e.g., an employment level of 20 was assigned when the reported range was 10-50 
employees). We further coded the employment levels of closed ventures with a zero value.  
Finally, we faced the question of how to code employment levels for very successful 
ventures. These outliers with several hundred employees can have large effects on the outcomes. 
Other very successful cases have been acquired by large companies and thus are no longer 
reported separately. To address these issues, we cap the maximum employment level at 100 
employees. We also code very successful exits as having 100 employees. The results are robust 
to instead using caps of 50 employees or 250 employees. Using a maximum of 100 employees, 
our average venture had 26 employees in 2010 (36 among operating businesses) versus 12 
employees at the time of the pitch. 
The second measure is an indicator variable for having been granted a patent by the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) by December 2010.  About a quarter of the 
ventures received a patent. Of course, many ventures in our sample are not seeking patent 
protection. We partially control for this in the regressions with our industry controls, but we 
acknowledge that patenting is an imperfect measure of innovation levels more generally. 
We also want to observe venture growth, but acquiring ongoing operational data is very 
challenging with unfunded ventures. We are able to use, however, web traffic records. To our 
knowledge, this is the first time that this measure has been employed in an entrepreneurial 
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finance study. We collected web traffic data from www.alexa.com, one of the largest providers 
of this type of information.
15
 
We collected web traffic data in the summer of 2008 and January 2010. We identify 91 of 
our 130 ventures in one of the two periods, and 58 ventures in both periods. The absolute level of 
web traffic and its rank are very dependent upon the specific traits and business models of 
ventures. This is true even within broad industry groups as degrees of customer interaction vary. 
Some venture groups may also wish to remain ―under the radar‖ for a few years until they are 
ready for product launch or have obtained intellectual property protection for their work. 
Moreover, the collection method by Alexa may introduce biases for certain venture types. We 
thus consider the changes in web performance for the venture between the two periods. These 
improvements or declines are more generally comparable across ventures. 
One variable simply compares the log ratio of the web rank in 2010 to that in 2008. This 
variable is attractive in that it measures the magnitudes of improvements and declines in traffic. 
A limitation, however, is that it is only defined for ventures whose web sites are active in both 
periods. We thus also define a second outcome measure as a binary indicator for improved 
venture performance on the web.
16
 This technique allows us to consider all 91 ventures for which 
we observe web traffic at some point, while sacrificing the granularity of the other measure.
17
 
                                                            
15 Alexa collects its data primarily by tracking the browsing patterns of web users who have installed the Alexa 
Toolbar, a piece of software that attaches itself to a user‘s Internet browser and records the user‘s web use in detail. 
According to the company, there are currently millions of such users. The statistics are then extrapolated from this 
user subset to the Internet population as a whole. The two ‗building block‘ pieces of information collected by the 
toolbar are web reach and page views. Web reach is a measure of what percentage of the total number of Internet 
users visit a website in question, and page views measures how many pages, on average, they visit on that website. 
Multiple page views by the same user in the same day only count as one entry in the data. The two usage variables 
are then combined to produce a variable known as site rank, with the most visited sites like Yahoo and Google 
having lower ranks. 
16 If we observe the web ranks in both 2008 and 2010, the indicator variable takes a value of one if the rank in 2010 
is better than that in 2008. If we only observe the firm on the web in 2008, we deem its web performance to have 
declined by 2010. Likewise, if we only observe the firm in 2010, we deem its web performance to have improved. 
17 Where possible, we also cross-checked the Alexa trends for ventures against Google Insights. Google Insights is 
based upon search queries made. While Google Insights allows for historical monthly measurement, the quality of 
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3.3. Venture Financing 
Our final measures describe whether the venture received venture financing. We define 
these measures through data collected from VentureXpert and CorpTech, and we cross-checked 
with as many ventures directly as possible. We consider both indicator variables for financing 
events and counts of financing rounds. As described below, we also use data on the investors in 
each round to identify the role of CommonAngels and Tech Coast Angels in subsequent 
financing events (either exclusively or in a syndicated deal). 
 
4. Results for Entrepreneurial Firms 
This section documents our empirical results for the consequences of entrepreneurial 
finance for start-ups. We first compare the subsequent outcomes of funded ventures with non-
funded ventures. We then test more closely the discontinuity between border investments and 
angel funding. We close by comparing the outcomes of ventures above and below the border. 
 
4.1. Funding and Firm Outcomes 
Tables 3a-3c quantify the relationship between angel group financing and outcomes. We 
focus on the 130 ventures that are used in our border analysis. This sample restriction removes 
both very low quality and very high quality ventures, focusing on ventures that are similar in 
quality and for which funding prospects were quite uncertain at the time of the pitch. We later 
consider alternative estimation techniques and the full sample of ventures. Appendix Table 2 
provides descriptive statistics on outcomes for the funded and unfunded groups. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
the search results varied much more across ventures than the web traffic measures. These differences are because 
relevant search terms can be much more ambiguous when ventures have common names or products than measures 
of the web traffic that went to a specific url. 
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Table 3a considers our outcome variables for venture success. In the first column, we 
regress a dummy variable for whether the venture was alive in 2010 on the indicator for whether 
the firm received funding from the angel group. In Panel A, we include only a constant and the 
funding dummy variable; in Panel B we control for angel group, industry, and year fixed effects 
(controlling for the year that the venture approached the angel group). The coefficients on the 
indicator variables are 0.20 and 0.25, both statistically significant at the 1% level. Firms that 
received angel funding are 20%-25% more likely to survive for at least four years. 
Column 2 shows that funded ventures are also 9%-11% more likely to undergo a 
successful exit by December 2010. In unreported specifications, we also disaggregated this result 
into a 4%-7% higher likelihood of successful acquisition and a 4%-5% higher likelihood of 
going public. Finally, Column 3 finds that the funded ventures are 16%-19% more likely to be 
successful, where success represents achieving 75 employees or a successful exit by December 
2010. Columns 4 and 5 show that this venture success result does not depend substantially on the 
threshold used to measure employment success. These additional outcomes are all statistically 
significant and precisely measured. Moreover, reflecting the use of indicator variables, they are 
very robust to modest changes in sample composition. 
Table 3b considers our metrics of venture operations and growth using a similar 
specification to Table 3a. The first column finds that funded ventures have 19-20 more 
employees in 2010 than unfunded ventures. This estimate is again statistically significant. 
Column 2 shows that this higher employment level in 2010 is not due to funded ventures having 
greater employment at the time of the pitch. Median regressions find an employment growth of 
13.0 (5.2) employees.
18
 
                                                            
18 Our data description highlighted the need to cap very high employment or successful exits at a certain 
employment level. The measured employment effect with controls is higher at 38.8 (16.5) employees if the cap is 
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Column 3 shows that funded ventures are 16%-18% more likely to have a granted patent. 
Columns 4 and 5 consider improvements and growth in web traffic performance. Funded 
ventures are 12%-16% more likely to have improved web performance, but these estimates are 
not precisely measured. On the other hand, our intensive measure of firm performance, the log 
ratio of web site ranks, finds a more powerful effect. Funded ventures show on average 32%-
39% greater improvements in web rank than unfunded ventures in recent years. 
Finally, Table 3c analyzes whether angel funding leads to other financing. Panels A and 
B consider indicator variables for types of financing activity, while Panels C and D consider 
counts of financing rounds. The first column begins with whether the venture ever receives 
professional venture capital financing. This starting point provides background on whether 
alternative financing to the angel group was easily available. We find that funded ventures are 
70% more likely to receive some form of venture financing than start-ups rejected by the angel 
groups. On average, they have 1.6-2.1 more financing rounds. These estimates suggest that 
rejected deals found it reasonably difficult to obtain venture financing at all. 
The estimates in Column 1 use data on venture financing that we developed from 
multiple sources, including contacting the venture directly. Column 2 shows similar results, but 
with somewhat lower elasticities, when we use only data that we obtain from searching 
VentureXpert. We will return to this estimation when discussing Table 4‘s expanded sample. 
Column 3 returns to the financing data used in Column 1 and removes the current angel 
financing event. Thus, we now compare the probability of a funded venture obtaining further 
financing to the probability of a rejected deal obtaining any financing. Even after excluding the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
increased to 250 employees. On the other hand, the estimated effect is 12.2 (3.6) employees if the cap is lowered to 
50 employees. Based upon the data we could collect for very successful ventures in our sample, a cap of 100 
employees appears most appropriate, and our preferred estimate is the 19-20 employee figure. 
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current angel financing event, the ventures funded by the angel groups are 21%-27% more likely 
to obtain later financing and have on average 0.8-1.2 more financing rounds. 
The last two columns quantify the role of the angel groups in these subsequent financing 
events. Column 4 counts deals that include investors other than the original angel groups. A 
comparison of Columns 3 and 4 shows that most of the additional financing events include 
outside investors. Column 5 alternatively counts deals that only include outside investors. The 
effects here are a third to a half of their magnitude in Column 3. Funding by these two angel 
groups aids access to follow-on financing, with a substantial portion of the subsequent deals 
syndicated by the angel groups with other venture financiers. 
Of course, we cannot tell from this analysis whether angel-backed firms pursue different 
growth or investment strategies and thus have to rely on more external funding. Alternatively, 
the powerful relationships could reflect a supply effect where angel group investors and board 
members provide networks, connections, and introductions that help ventures access additional 
funding. We return to this issue below after viewing our border discontinuity results.
19
 
 
4.2. The Role of Sample Construction 
The results in Tables 3a-3c suggest that funding by these angel groups is associated with 
improved venture performance. In describing our data and empirical methodology, we noted 
several ways that our analysis differed from a standard analysis. We first consider only ventures 
that approach our angel investors, rather than attempting to draw similar firms from the full 
population of business activity to compare to funded ventures. This step helps ensure ex ante 
                                                            
19 We do not find that being financed by the angel groups materially influences the types of venture investors 
subsequently accessed, at least in terms of venture fund size or age (two common proxies for the prestige of venture 
funds). These results question one common rationale given for pitching to angel investors—that they provide an 
entry to prestigious venture capital firms later.  
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comparable treatment and control groups in that all the ventures are seeking high growth. 
Second, we substantially narrow even this distribution of prospective deals until we have a group 
of companies that are ex ante comparable. This removes heterogeneous quality in the ventures 
that approach the angel investors. Finally, we introduce the border discontinuity to bring 
exogenous variation in funding outcomes. 
Before proceeding to the border discontinuity, it is useful to gauge how much the second 
step—narrowing the sample of ventures to remove quality differences inherent in the selection 
funnel—influences our regression estimates. Table 4 presents this analysis for one outcome 
variable and the Tech Coast Angels data. We are restricted to only one outcome variable by the 
intense effort to build any outcomes data for unfunded ventures. The likelihood of receiving 
venture funding is the easiest variable to extend to the full sample. 
The first column repeats a modified, univariate form of Column 2 in Table 3b with just 
the Tech Coast Angels sample. The elasticities are very similar, and we only use the information 
that we would have collected from VentureXpert. The second column expands the sample to 
include 2385 potential ventures in the Tech Coast Angels database. The elasticity increases 25% 
to 0.56. The difference in elasticities between the two columns demonstrates the role of sample 
construction in assessing angel funding and venture performance. The narrower sample provides 
a more comparable control group. Our rough estimate of the bias due to not controlling for 
heterogeneous quality is thus about a quarter of the true association. 
The third and fourth columns demonstrate this bias in a second way. In Column 3 we 
regress a dummy variable for obtaining venture funding on the linear interest variable. By itself, 
collective interest is very predictive of future outcomes; the coefficient on the angel funding 
dummy is 0.11 and significant at the 1% level. This positive association, moreover, holds when 
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excluding companies that Tech Coast Angels ultimately funds. In unreported regressions, we 
find that the interest level variable has a coefficient of 0.006 (0.002), indicative of the power of 
the screening mechanism. The fourth column shows that controlling for the ex ante interest 
levels of the angels, and thereby the approximate quality of investment opportunities, reduces the 
measured elasticity in the full sample to a little less than that measured for our border group. In 
total, these results suggest that while there is a positive and significant relationship between the 
level of interest by the angels in a deal and the underlying quality of the firms, there is a strong 
non-linearity in outcomes for those deals that were supported by the angel group versus those 
that were not.  
Finally, Column 5 shows a similar pattern with another econometric technique. We create 
a matched sample where we pair funded ventures with unfunded ventures that are as close as 
possible in terms of interest levels, date of pitch, city/chapter, industry, stage, and employment at 
time of pitch. We drop funded ventures for which a close match is not available. This technique 
again produces very similar outcomes.
20
 The combined results of Table 4 emphasize the 
importance of identifying a comparable control group in terms of venture quality for measuring 
the outcomes of venture financing events. 
 
4.3. Border Discontinuities and Angel Funding 
We next turn to our border discontinuity exercise. Table 5 formally tests that there is a 
significant discontinuity in funding around the thresholds for the ventures considered by Tech 
Coast Angels and CommonAngels. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals 
one if the firm received funding and zero otherwise. The primary explanatory variable is an 
                                                            
20 The matched sample in Table 4 includes ventures outside of our primary interest region where an appropriate 
match could be identified. We have further confirmed that our results across the other outcome variables hold when 
using a matched sample approach within our primary interest region.  
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indicator variable for the venture being above or below the interest discontinuity. Appendix 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on outcomes for the above and below border groups.  
Column 1 presents a regression with just a constant, while Column 2 controls for angel 
group fixed effects, year fixed effects, and industry fixed effects. These regressions combine data 
from the two angel groups. Across these two groups, we have 130 deals that are evenly 
distributed above and below the discontinuity. We find that there is a statistically and 
economically significant relationship between funding likelihood and being above the border: 
being above the border increases funding likelihood by about 32%. Clearly, the border line 
designation is not a perfect rule—and this fuzziness will limit below how strongly we interpret 
the regression discontinuity—but it does signify a very strong shift in funding probability among 
ventures that are ex ante comparable as shown in Table 2. 
Column 3 shows similar results when we add year and angel group fixed effects. These 
fixed effects control for the secular trends of each angel group. The funding jump also holds for 
each angel group individually. Column 4 repeats the regression controlling for deal 
characteristics like firm size and number of employees at the time of the pitch. The sample size 
shrinks to 87, as we only have this information for Tech Coast Angel deals. But despite the 
smaller sample size, we still find a significant difference in funding probability. The magnitude 
of the effect is comparable to the full sample at 29%. Unreported regressions find a group-
specific elasticity for CommonAngels of 0.45 (0.21). These results suggest that the identified 
discontinuities provide a reasonable identification strategy.
21
 
                                                            
21 We find similar results in a variety of robustness checks. To report one, concern could exist that angels have fixed 
voting patterns that skew the scores. For example, the most meaningful endorsement for a venture could come from 
an angel who very rarely expresses interest in any deal, and so his or her vote carries unequal weight in the 
decisions. These patterns could be obscured in our aggregated measures. To check this, we develop a second 
measure of the interest level in deals that normalizes each angel‘s total expressed interest to be the same. That is, we 
down-weight the votes of angels who express interest in every deal. We find very similar results to those reported 
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4.4. Border Discontinuities and Firm Outcomes 
Tables 6a-6c consider venture outcomes and the border discontinuity. Even after 
eliminating observable heterogeneity through sample selection, the results in Tables 3a-3c are 
still subject to the criticism that ventures are endogenously funded. Omitted variables may also 
be present. Looking above and below the funding discontinuity helps us to evaluate whether the 
ventures that looked ex ante comparable, except in their probability of being funded, are now 
performing differently. This test provides a measure of exogeneity to the relationship between 
angel financing and venture outcomes. 
Tables 6a and 6b have the same format as Tables 3a and 3b; the only difference is that the 
explanatory variable is the indicator variable for being above the funding border. The 
coefficients are not directly comparable across the two estimation approaches, but we can 
compare the qualitative results.
22
 In Table 6a, being above the border is associated with stronger 
chances for survival, but it is only qualitatively associated with venture success by December 
2010 as measured by successful exits or having 75 or more employees. In Table 6b, above border 
ventures are associated with generally better operating performance as measured by employment 
levels, patenting, and web site traffic growth. Median regressions find an employment growth of 
15.0 (4.1) employees. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
below, which suggests that our identification strategy is not being contaminated by band-wagon effects and angel-
specific heterogeneity in voting. 
It is also worth noting that the professional managers of both angel groups found this funding discontinuity a 
reasonable description of their groups‘ behavior. One manager noted that because the angels need to jointly invest, 
the development of critical mass behind a deal is essential and non-linear. He also noted that the group early on 
(before our sample) changed its meeting procedures so that angels scored their sheets before an open group 
discussion was held to allow collection of more independent views of the venture.     
22 The coefficients would be comparable if we used the border discontinuity in an instrumental variables framework. 
Given the substantial fuzziness of our funding discontinuity, we only use this empirical approach to confirm the 
overall qualitative direction of our findings. 
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This comparability indicates that endogeneity in funding choices and omitted variable 
biases are not driving the general association found earlier between financing by these two 
groups and start-up performance. The results in Table 6a, however, do suggest that some of the 
association between funding and venture success by December 2010 may be due to factors not 
captured by the angel interest levels (e.g., the speed with which the investment can reach a 
liquidity event).   
Finally, Table 6c looks at border outcomes with respect to venture financing. The 
identification of the investors is not very meaningful in this context, and so we simply focus on 
whether the venture receives any financing (at all or removing the current financing round). 
Table 6c shows that being above the border discontinuity does not lead to greater venture 
financing in later years. This null result may indicate that the least squares association between 
current financing and future financing reflects the investment and growth strategies of the 
financiers, but that this path is not necessary for venture growth or success as measured by our 
outcome variables in Tables 6a and 6b. This interpretation would also fit with the substantial 
syndication evident in Table 3c. We return to these questions in our conclusions.
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5. Performance of Angel Investors 
One natural concern is whether these investments represent an economically driven 
activity, since angels are individuals who often derive utility from simply meeting with and 
investing in entrepreneurs. This raises questions about whether our findings could apply to the 
venture investment process as a whole. One way to address this concern is to look at the angels‘ 
                                                            
23 We have confirmed the border results in several ways. Perhaps most important, the results do not depend upon 
how the two angel groups are combined or changes in angel group size over the sample. Similar patterns emerge, for 
example, when considering Tech Coast Angels in the period after 2001. We also find positive associations for each 
group individually, although some results are not statistically significant due to smaller sample sizes. 
30 
 
returns relative to those of the typical professional venture capital funds. If these two measures 
are comparable, then this will dispel some of these hobbyist concerns.
24
 
We undertake this analysis using venture capital data from VentureXpert, which has been 
previously extensively used in earlier research (e.g., Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). We compare on 
an annual basis the investment multiples of the industry to that of one of the angel groups.  We 
compute two ratios (as of December 2009): 1) the amount returned to investors to the amount 
invested (distributed to paid-in capital) and 2) the sum of the distributed capital and the current 
remaining value of the investment portfolio to the amount invested (total value to paid-in 
capital). We compute a simple average across years and one weighted by the venture capital 
investment in each year. 
There are two complications. First, professional venture funds charge investors a 
management fee (typically 2% of committed capital) and retain a share of the profits (usually 
20%, termed carried interest). The returns reported by VentureXpert are net of these fees. Direct 
investments by angels do not incur these costs. We thus adjust the returns of the angel groups as 
if they had paid these fees, assuming that an extra amount equal to the management fees incurred 
from the time of the investment to December 31, 2009 was raised but not invested. Second, we 
reduce any distributions by 20% of the difference between the value of the distribution and the 
amount invested in the distributed shares to reflect the carried interest. 
A second complication is that the angel data are computed using investment dates, while 
VentureXpert‘s tabulations are arranged by the fund‘s vintage year (measured using the final 
closing date of the fund). The actual investment may be earlier—many groups will begin 
                                                            
24 Of course, this analysis does not prove that the findings about the impact of angel investors will really carry over 
to other investors. For instance, even if the returns were equal, it might be that the angel groups invest more 
unobservable effort, and their approach would not be sustainable if they priced their inputs at market rate. Again, it 
is important to note that both funds have professional managers and that CommonAngels further raises venture 
funds from limited partners that its professional managers invest alongside the angels (e.g., Applegate et al., 2010). 
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investing immediately after the first closing—or later, continuing for a number of years after the 
final closing. Data constraints require that we use the inexact time comparisons: we compare the 
angel investments to the performance of venture funds raised two years later. 
Table 7 presents the comparison, with the bottom lines providing the summary statistics. 
Using a simple average, the two groups are about equivalent when using the distributed capital 
measure, while the angel group outperforms using the total value measure. When weighted, the 
venture industry outperforms when using the distributed capital measure, while the angel group 
outperforms using the total value measure. Collectively, the evidence provides little support for 
claim that angel investors are hobbyists who are not seriously pursuing the investment process. 
 
6. Conclusions and Interpretations 
This study analyzes two prominent angel groups and their effects on the start-ups in 
which they invest. We find that the angel investments enhance the outcomes and performance of 
the firms that are funded by these groups. Using a variety of econometric techniques, we find 
consistent evidence that financing by these angel groups is associated with improved likelihood 
of survival for four or more years, higher levels of employment, and more traffic on the web sites 
of these firms. We also find evidence that angel group financing helps in achieving successful 
exits and reaching high employment levels. These latter success results are strong in the base 
data, but they are only qualitatively supported in the border analysis. 
Our evidence regarding the role of angel funding for access to future venture financing is 
mixed. Being funded by one of the angel groups is associated with superior follow-on financing 
in the base data, but there is no evidence that this matters around the border discontinuity (where 
the other results are supported). We do not want to push this asymmetry too far, but one might 
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speculate that access to capital per se is not the most important value added that angel groups 
provide. Our results suggest that some of the ―softer‖ features, such as their mentoring or 
business contacts, may help new ventures the most. 
Overall, we find that the interest levels of angels at the stages of the initial presentation 
and due diligence are predictive of investment success. These findings suggest that in addition to 
having a causal impact on the venture they fund, angels engage in an efficient selection and 
screening process which sorts proposals into relevant bins: complete losers, truly exceptional 
opportunities, potential winners, and so on (e.g., Kerr and Nanda, 2009). 
At the same time, this paper leaves many questions unanswered. Our experiment does not 
allow us to identify the costs of angel funding (e.g., Hsu, 2004), as we cannot observe equity 
positions in the unfunded ventures. We thus cannot evaluate whether taking the money was 
worth it from the entrepreneur‘s perspective after these costs are considered. In addition, we 
cannot test the impact of angel funding against specific alternative counterfactuals, such as 
whether the venture would have been better off with venture capital funding. 
Moreover, we have looked at just a few of the many angel investment groups that are 
active in the U.S. Our groups are professionally organized and managed, and it is important for 
future research to examine a broader distribution of investment groups and their impact for 
venture success. Likewise, future work needs to evaluate the performance of individual angel 
investors. It would be important to understand whether the dual motives of many angels—
financial returns and non-pecuniary benefits from working with entrepreneurs—affect their 
approach and the type of support that these investors provide. Our paper demonstrates that angel 
investments can have an important impact on the deals they support and offers an empirical 
foothold for analyzing many important questions in entrepreneurial finance.    
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Figure 1: Tech Coast Angels Investment Process 
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Figure 2: CommonAngels Pitch Evaluation Sheet 
 
Angel group Number of Cumulative Share funded
interest level ventures share of ventures by angel group
0 1640 64% 0%
1-4 537 84% 0.7%
5-9 135 90% 3.7%
10-14 75 93% 12.0%
15-19 52 95% 17.3%
20-24 42 96% 38.1%
25-29 33 97% 30.3%
30-34 21 98% 28.6%
35+ 44 100% 40.9%
Table 1:  Angel group selection funnel
Notes:  Table documents the selection funnel for Tech Coast Angels.  The first column 
provides bins based upon the number of angels expressing interest in a deal.  Column 2 
describes the number of ventures that fell into each bin.  Column 3 provides the cumulative 
fraction for each interest level.  Column 4 reports the percentage of deals at each level that 
ultimately received funding from the angel group.
Traits of ventures above and Above border Below border Two-tailed t-test
below border discontinuity ventures ventures for equality of means
Basic characteristics
Financing sought ($ thousands) 1683 1306 0.277
Documents from company 3.0 2.5 0.600
Management team size 5.8 5.4 0.264
Employee count 13.4 11.2 0.609
Primary industry (%)
Biopharma and healthcare 23.9 29.3 0.579
Computers, electronics, and measurement 15.2 17.1 0.817
Internet and e-commerce 39.1 39.0 0.992
Other industries 21.7 14.6 0.395
Company stage (%)
Good idea 2.2 2.4 0.936
Initial marketing and product development 34.8 46.3 0.279
Revenue generating 63.0 51.2 0.272
Angel group decisions
Documents by angel members 10.5 5.1 0.004
Discussion items by angel members 12.0 6.7 0.002
Share funded 63.0 39.0 0.025
Observations 46 41
Table 2:  Comparison of groups above and below border discontinuity
Notes:  Table compares the ex ante traits of ventures above and below the border discontinuity.  Columns 2 and 3 present 
the means of the above border and below border groups, respectively.  The fourth column tests for the equality of the 
means, and the t-tests allow for unequal variance.  The first panel compares venture traits documented at the time of the 
investment pitch.  The first row tests equality for log value of financing sought.  The second and third panels compare the 
distribution of ventures in terms of industries and stages of development, respectively.  The shares in these panels sum to 
100%.  The final panel considers differences in the subsequent activities and funding of the angel investors for the 
groups.
(0,1) venture in (0,1) venture (0,1) venture (0,1) venture (0,1) venture 
operation or underwent underwent underwent underwent 
successful exit successful exit successful exit successful exit successful exit
by December 2010 (IPO or acquired) or had 75+ empl. or had 50+ empl. or had 100+ empl.
by December 2010 by December 2010 by December 2010 by December 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture 0.199 0.093 0.187 0.209 0.153
funding being received from angel group (0.081) (0.051) (0.067) (0.072) (0.065)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture 0.246 0.110 0.163 0.196 0.151
funding being received from angel group (0.083) (0.054) (0.074) (0.080) (0.074)
Observations 130 130 130 130 130
Table 3a:  Analysis of angel group financing and venture success
Notes:  Panel A includes linear regressions of firm outcomes on a dummy variable for whether the firm received venture funding.  Regressions in Panel B include 
industry, year, and angel group fixed effects.  The first column tests whether the venture is alive in December 2010.  The second column tests whether the venture had a 
successful IPO or acquisition by December 2010.  Columns 3 to 5 also consider ventures successful if they achieved indicated employment levels in December 2010.  
Robust standard errors are reported.
A.  Base regression
B.  Panel A including angel group, year, and industry fixed effects
Employee Employee (0,1) indicator (0,1) indicator Log ratio of 
count in 2010 count in 2010 variable for variable for 2010 web rank
with a maximum with a maximum granted patent improved web to 2008 rank
of 100 employees of 100 employees by 2010 from rank from 2008 (negative values
USPTO to 2010 are improvements)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture 19.799 16.121 0.156 0.116 -0.324
funding being received from angel group (5.829) (6.811) (0.077) (0.096) (0.191)
Employment level at the time that 0.647
the venture approached the angel group (0.143)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture 19.264 17.959 0.175 0.162 -0.389
funding being received from angel group (6.541) (8.487) (0.084) (0.107) (0.212)
Employment level at the time that 0.679
the venture approached the angel group (0.152)
Observations 130 83 130 91 58
Table 3b:  Analysis of angel group financing and venture operations and growth
Notes:  Panel A includes linear regressions of firm outcomes on a dummy variable for whether the firm received venture funding.  Regressions in Panel B include 
industry, year, and angel group fixed effects.  The first column tests employment levels in 2010.  Failed ventures are given zero employment, and a maximum of 100 
employees is given for very successful ventures.  Very successful acquisitions are also given this maximum value.  The second column also controls for employment at 
the time the venture approached the angel group.  Column 3 is an indicator variable for having been granted a patent by the USPTO.  The last two columns test for 
improved venture performance through web site traffic data from 2008 to 2010.  Column 4 is an indicator variable for improved performance, while Column 5 gives log 
ratios of web traffic (a negative value indicates better performance).  Robust standard errors are reported.
B.  Panel A including angel group, year, and industry fixed effects
A.  Base regression
Receives any Receives any Receives later Receives later Column 3
venture financing venture financing venture financing venture financing excluding deals
as reported in than the current with investors that are syndicated 
Venture Xpert angel investment other than original with the original
angel investors angel investors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture 0.704 0.382 0.213 0.230 0.077
funding being received from angel group (0.055) (0.082) (0.085) (0.085) (0.084)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture 0.706 0.405 0.270 0.253 0.124
funding being received from angel group (0.063) (0.087) (0.090) (0.092) (0.095)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture 1.624 1.302 0.777 0.963 0.404
funding being received from angel group (0.361) (0.388) (0.371) (0.392) (0.355)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture 2.065 1.765 1.239 1.385 0.762
funding being received from angel group (0.436) (0.467) (0.446) (0.477) (0.436)
Observations 130 130 130 130 130
Table 3c:  Analysis of angel group financing and venture financing
C.  Base regression: Count of financing rounds for indicated financing activity
D.  Panel C including angel group, year, and industry fixed effects
Notes:  Panels A and C include linear regressions of firm outcomes on a dummy variable for whether the firm received venture funding.  Regressions in Panels B and D 
include industry, year, and angel group fixed effects.  Column 1 tests whether the venture receives financing, including the current angel financing event.  The second 
column uses only data of financings in Venture Xpert, which we build upon in Table 4.  The third column excludes the current angel financing round where applicable.  
The fourth column considers deals that have investors other than CommonAngels and Tech Coast Angels.  The last column considers deals that do not involve 
CommonAngels and Tech Coast Angels at all.  Across these outcomes, Panels A and B present binary indicator variables, while Panels C and D consider counts of 
financing rounds.  Robust standard errors are reported.
A. Base regression: (0,1) indicator variable for indicated financing activity
B.  Panel A including angel group, year, and industry fixed effects
Outcome variable is (0,1) indicator Simple TCA Matched
variable for receiving venture univariate sample on
financing as reported in Venture Xpert regression with Base Interest Combined interest levels
(see Column 2 of Table 3c) border sample estimation levels estimation and covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture 0.432 0.562 0.403 0.418
funding being received from angel group (0.095) (0.054) (0.071) (0.070)
Number of angels expressing 0.011 0.007
interest in the deal (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 87 2385 2385 2385 167
Table 4:  Border samples versus full samples
Notes:  Linear regressions quantify the role of sample construction in the relationship between funding and venture outcomes.  Column 1 repeats a modified, univariate 
form of Column 2 in Table 3c with just the Tech Coast Angels sample.  Column 2 expands the sample to include all of the potential ventures in the Tech Coast Angels 
database, similar to Table 1.  The difference in elasticities between the two columns quantifies the role of sample construction in assessing angel funding and venture 
performance.  As a second technique, Columns 3 and 4 analyze interest levels joint with funding.  Column 5 considers a matched sample approach, where we pair 
funded ventures with unfunded ventures that are closest to them in terms of interest levels and covariates (year of pitch, city/chapter, industry, stage, initial 
employment).  Robust standard errors are reported.
Full TCA univariate regression 
with complete sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture being 0.316 0.328 0.324 0.292
above the funding border discontinuity (0.085) (0.089) (0.094) (0.110)
Angel group, year, and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year x angel group fixed effects Yes
Additional controls Yes
Observations 130 130 130 87
Table 5:  Border discontinuity and venture funding by angel groups
Notes:  Column 1 reports a linear regression of venture funding by the angel groups on a dummy variable for being above the border discontinuity.  
Column 2 includes industry, year, and angel group fixed effects.  Column 3 includes year x angel group fixed effects.  Column 4 includes additional 
controls of stage of company and employment levels fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are reported.
(0,1) indicator variable for being funded by angel group
(0,1) venture in (0,1) venture (0,1) venture (0,1) venture (0,1) venture 
operation or underwent underwent underwent underwent 
successful exit successful exit successful exit successful exit successful exit
by December 2010 (IPO or acquired) or had 75+ empl. or had 50+ empl. or had 100+ empl.
by December 2010 by December 2010 by December 2010 by December 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture being 0.222 0.074 0.116 0.081 0.112
above the funding border discontinuity (0.081) (0.052) (0.069) (0.074) (0.067)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture being 0.247 0.075 0.088 0.057 0.095
above the funding border discontinuity (0.095) (0.058) (0.086) (0.089) (0.082)
Observations 130 130 130 130 130
Table 6a:  Analysis of border discontinuity and venture success
Notes:  Panel A includes linear regressions of firm outcomes on a dummy variable for whether the firm was above the border discontinuity.  Regressions in Panel B 
include industry, year, and angel group fixed effects.  The first column tests whether the venture is alive in December 2010.  The second column tests whether the 
venture had a successful IPO or acquisition by December 2010.  Columns 3 to 5 also consider ventures successful if they achieved indicated employment levels in 
December 2010.  Robust standard errors are reported.
A.  Base regression
B.  Panel A including angel group, year, and industry fixed effects
Employee Employee (0,1) indicator (0,1) indicator Log ratio of 
count in 2010 count in 2010 variable for variable for 2010 web rank
with a maximum with a maximum granted patent improved web to 2008 rank
of 100 employees of 100 employees by 2010 from rank from 2008 (negative values
USPTO to 2010 are improvements)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture being 14.339 9.558 0.190 0.244 -0.356
above the funding border discontinuity (5.974) (6.925) (0.079) (0.097) (0.194)
Employment level at the time that 0.711
the venture approached the angel group (0.131)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture being 12.431 11.187 0.154 0.232 -0.382
above the funding border discontinuity (7.421) (8.006) (0.089) (0.120) (0.249)
Employment level at the time that 0.755
the venture approached the angel group (0.150)
Observations 130 83 130 91 58
Table 6b:  Analysis of border discontinuity and venture operations and growth
Notes:  Panel A includes linear regressions of firm outcomes on a dummy variable for whether the firm was above the border discontinuity.  Regressions in Panel B 
include industry, year, and angel group fixed effects.  The first column tests employment levels in 2010.  Failed ventures are given zero employment, and a maximum of 
100 employees is given for very successful ventures.  Very successful acquisitions are also given this maximum value.  The second column also controls for 
employment at the time the venture approached the angel group.  Column 3 is an indicator variable for having been granted a patent by the USPTO.  The last two 
columns test for improved venture performance through web site traffic data from 2008 to 2010.  Column 4 is an indicator variable for improved performance, while 
Column 5 gives log ratios of web traffic (a negative value indicates better performance).  Robust standard errors are reported.
B.  Panel A including angel group, year, and industry fixed effects
A.  Base regression
Receives any Receives later
venture financing venture financing
than the current
angel investment
(1) (2)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture being 0.162 0.069
above the funding border discontinuity (0.085) (0.089)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture being 0.177 -0.033
above the funding border discontinuity (0.094) (0.102)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture being -0.224 -0.535
above the funding border discontinuity (0.367) (0.352)
(0,1) indicator variable for venture being -0.039 -0.369
above the funding border discontinuity (0.459) (0.421)
Observations 130 130
Table 6c:  Analysis of border discontinuity and venture financing
C. Base regression: Count of financing rounds
D.  Panel C including controls
Notes:  Panels A and C include linear regressions of firm outcomes on a dummy variable for whether the firm 
was above the border discontinuity.  Regressions in Panels B and D include industry, year, and angel group 
fixed effects.  Column 1 tests whether the venture receives financing, including the current angel financing 
event.  The second column excludes the current angel financing round where applicable.  Across these 
outcomes, Panels A and B present binary indicator variables, while Panels C and D consider counts of 
financing rounds.  Robust standard errors are reported.
A. Base regression: (0,1) indicator variable
B.  Panel A including controls
Fund 
year
Sample 
size
Total VC funds 
raised in 
vintage year 
($B)
Capital 
weighted 
average: 
D/PI
Capital 
weighted 
average: 
TV/PI
Year
$ Invested Distributed 
capital ($s)
Total value 
($s)
Estimated 
fees paid 
($s)
Estimated 
carry paid 
($s)
D/PI TV/PI Net of 
fee 
D/PI
Net of 
fee 
TV/PI
1995 49 9.5 3.84 4.16 1997 $1,150,000 $18,630,000 $18,630,000 $178,250 $3,496,000 16.20 16.20 11.39 11.39
1996 36 12.0 4.22 4.78 1998 $6,285,510 $242,342 $3,130,342 $974,254 $0 0.04 0.50 0.03 0.43
1997 64 19.8 2.11 2.37 1999 $16,331,104 $10,386,749 $13,138,226 $2,531,321 $0 0.64 0.80 0.55 0.70
1998 78 30.0 1.28 1.72 2000 $12,819,029 $5,588,458 $13,815,428 $1,986,949 $80,610 0.44 1.08 0.37 0.93
1999 107 55.7 0.45 0.74 2001 $6,563,700 $4,277,088 $35,390,216 $1,000,964 $696,766 0.65 5.39 0.47 4.59
2000 122 104.5 0.48 1.03 2002 $3,701,495 $1,218,194 $3,977,907 $545,971 $16,930 0.33 1.07 0.28 0.93
2001 59 38.9 0.56 1.16 2003 $4,251,519 $914,050 $6,967,163 $596,276 $71,255 0.21 1.64 0.17 1.42
2002 20 9.4 0.21 0.97 2004 $7,466,829 $615,813 $9,617,376 $970,688 $27,540 0.08 1.29 0.07 1.14
2003 17 11.6 0.34 1.11 2005 $14,079,569 $350,000 $17,975,928 $1,548,753 $15,173 0.02 1.28 0.02 1.15
2004 23 19.8 0.24 1.04 2006 $11,567,778 $1,025,000 $16,189,696 $1,041,100 $58,524 0.09 1.40 0.08 1.28
2005 21 29.0 0.11 1.02 2007 $9,469,772 $0 $7,538,680 $662,884 $0 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.74
2006 38 22.0 0.11 0.96 2008 $6,527,593 $0 $5,421,499 $326,380 $0 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.79
Wtd average, VC funds raised 1.16 1.76 1.56 2.69 1.12 2.12
Wtd average, TCA weights 0.78 1.33 0.72 2.15 0.54 1.80
Table 7:  Analysis of angel group portfolio investment returns
Notes:  Table compares performance of an angel group fund to the venture capital industry as a whole.  We use a two-year lag (e.g., comparing 2005 venture funds to 2007 angel 
investments) under the assumption that funds invest with a lag.  Weights used in the first weighted industry average returns are based on total VC dollars raised.  Weights used in the 
second weighted industry average employ the same year distribution as the angel group's investments.  Net of fee assumes 2% management fee for first seven years and 0.5% for next 
three years; analysis assumes additional funds raised to cover fees.  Net of carry assumes 20% of difference between distributed and invested capital; deducted from distributed capital or 
total value.  Performance is as of June 30, 2010.  Industry data from Thomson Reuters.
Angel group performance, by year of investmentCumulative US VC vintage year performance
Year Total count Angels Angels Angels in Average Average Mean Median Share Funded
of ventures expressing expressing 10+ deals interest interest interest interest of ventures share adj.
examined interest in interest in per active level incl. level excl. in funded in funded that are for external
by group 1+ deals 10+ deals chapter zeros zeros ventures ventures funded decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2001 346 62 57 29 1.7 6.5 10.2 13.0 2.9% 3.5%
2002 313 77 72 36 1.9 7.8 27.0 25.5 2.6% 2.9%
2003 311 196 135 34 2.7 9.0 19.7 21.0 4.8% 5.5%
2004 343 169 135 34 2.5 7.8 30.8 34.5 2.9% 3.2%
2005 312 183 146 37 3.5 7.6 27.0 23.0 3.8% 4.0%
2006 406 214 158 40 3.9 8.5 26.4 21.0 4.2% 4.3%
App. Table 1:  Extended data on angel group selection funnel
Notes:  Table documents the annual activity of Tech Coast Angels.  The first column lists the count of ventures examined by the group.  The next two columns 
show the number of angels expressing interest in deals, with our primary count being the angels who express interest in ten or more deals (over all the years that 
we observe).  Tech Coast Angels expands from two to four chapters in 2003.  One of the new chapters pre-existed as a separate angel group; the second pulled 
both new and existing members.  On a per chapter basis, the number of active angels remains mostly constant during this growth period, as shown in the fourth 
column.  The fifth column shows that the average interest in a deal rises over the sample.  This increase is primarily due to fewer deals receiving zero interest.  
The average non-zero interest is flatter in Column 6.  The seventh and eighth columns show that the mean and median interest levels for funded ventures is 
mostly flat during our sample, with the exception of the lower values in 2001.  The mean interest statistic caps interest levels at 50 angels.  The last two 
columns show the share of ventures funded by year, with the tenth column adjusting for external decisions (e.g., the venture withdrew to take funding 
elsewhere).  These funding percentages have minor fluctuations around 3.5% during the sample period.
Outcomes of ventures funded Funded Unfunded Two-tailed t-test
and unfunded ventures ventures for equality of means
Venture success by December 2010
(0,1) venture in operation or successful exit 0.763 0.563 0.016
(0,1) venture underwent successful exit (IPO or acquisition) 0.136 0.042 0.070
(0,1) venture underwent successful exit or had 75 employees 0.271 0.085 0.007
Venture operations and growth by December 2010
Employee count in 2010 with a maximum of 100 employees 36.8 17.0 0.001
(0,1) venture had a granted patent by 2010 from USPTO 0.339 0.183 0.047
(0,1) venture had an improve web rank from 2008 to 2010 0.356 0.239 0.229
Log ratio of 2010 web rank to 2008 web rank (negative good) -0.030 0.294 0.096
Venture financing by December 2010
(0,1) venture receives any venture financing 1.000 0.296 0.000
Count of venture financing rounds 2.525 0.901 0.000
Observations 59 71
App. Table 2:  Simple outcomes comparisons for funded and unfunded groups
Notes:  See Tables 3a-3c.
Outcomes of ventures above and Above border Below border Two-tailed t-test
below border discontinuity ventures ventures for equality of means
Venture success by December 2010
(0,1) venture in operation or successful exit 0.782 0.560 0.007
(0,1) venture underwent successful exit (IPO or acquisition) 0.127 0.053 0.161
(0,1) venture underwent successful exit or had 75 employees 0.236 0.120 0.095
Venture operations and growth by December 2010
Employee count in 2010 with a maximum of 100 employees 34.3 19.9 0.018
(0,1) venture had a granted patent by 2010 from USPTO 0.364 0.173 0.018
(0,1) venture had an improve web rank from 2008 to 2010 0.436 0.192 0.015
Log ratio of 2010 web rank to 2008 web rank (negative good) -0.080 0.276 0.071
Venture financing by December 2010
(0,1) venture receives any venture financing 0.709 0.547 0.057
Count of venture financing rounds 1.509 1.733 0.542
Observations 55 75
App. Table 3:  Simple outcomes comparisons for border discontinuity groups
Notes:  See Tables 6a-6c.
